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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY
__

In The Matter of RONDELL JOHNSON.
Petitioner,
-againstANDREA D. EVANS, CHAIRMAN/CEO
BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-10-ST1691 Index No. 3323-10
Appearances :

Rondell Johnson
Inmate No. 98-B- 1583
Petitioner, Pro Se
Southport Correctional Facility
236 Institution Road
P.O. Box 2000
Pine City, N Y 14871
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Brian J. O’Donnell,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT
Georee B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate at Southport Correctional Facility, has commenced the
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determifiahm of respondent dated June 2,
2009 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving an
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indeterminate term of imprisonment of ten to twenty years on a conviction of the crime of
first degree burglary, with a concurrent term of two and one half to five years for second
degree assault. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner indicates that
the respondent failed to timely issue a decision with respect to his administrative appeal. He
maintains that the sole factor the Commissioners considered was the seriousness of the
offenses for which he is incarcerated. In his view, the Parole Board failed to consider other
factors under Executive Law tj 2594. He maintains that the actions of the Parole Board were
tantamount to a re-sentencing. The petitioner points olit that he has completed several
programs during the course of his incarceration, including AKT, ASATRSAT, pre-GED and
GED. While incarcerated he has served as a porter and a student in independent study. In
his words, he has “never refused a program”. His post-release plan is to live with his mother
in Rochester, New York. He is a fitness trainer and plans, upon being released, to be
employed in a gym. With regard to the seriousness of his offenses, he contends that he has
served an excessive amount of time (over 1 1 years) for his crimes, particularly since he only
shot his victim in the wrist; and that in any event the seriousness of his crimes may not
properly serve as the sole basis for denial of release. The petitioner maintains that the parole
interview was carried out in an improper manner in that it was conducted by video
conference rather than having him personally appear before the Parole Board. He contends
that this deprived him of his right to confront and cross-examination witnesses and his
“accusers”.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are sct forth 3s follow:
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“After a review of the record and interview, the Panel has
determined that if released at this time there is a reasonable
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without
again violating the law and your release would be incompatible
with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious
nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law. This
decision is based on the following factors: Your 1 . 0 . ’ ~idare
burglary lst and assault 2d in which you entered a dwelling
while armed with a gun and shot the victim. Then while
incarcerated you acted in concert and caused physical injury to
a victim. Note is made of your sentencing minutes, poor
disciplinary record and all required factors. You continue to
have serious disciplinary problems, a poor parole plan and have
continued drug related issues. Parole is denied.”

As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law 9259-i [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3d Dept.,
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200 13). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,
the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
supra). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon

v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his “somewhat” improved disciplinary
record, and his plans upon release. He was afforded ample time to make a statement in
support of his release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the
reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594

(seeMatter of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whiteheadv. Russi, 20 1 AD2d 825
[3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677
[3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the
seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York
State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New
York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d
863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (G l ? ; ~ t t ~ofFarid
+r
v Trwi?,
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239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept.,
19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor
that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one

(see Matter of Y w ~ vo New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d

1681 113” Dept., 20101;

Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of
Executive Law

6 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd

Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v Rcii 1 ULA SLJLCBib i w i i ui I’duuI~,3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
With regard to petitioner’s claim that the determination to deny parole is tantamount
to a re-sentencing, the Court finds the assertion to be factually unsupported, conclusory and
without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd
Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive Department Board of Appeals

Unit, 28 1 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 200 11; Matter of Evans v Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup.
Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum
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sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release

(see

Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 11 14, 11 15 [3rdDept., 20081). The Parole Board is
vested with the discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the
fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of
Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141,
1142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37
AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).
With respect to petitioner’s argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seekjudicial
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR

4 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York

State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rdDept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex
rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rdDept., 20001; Matter of Mentor v New York State
Division of Parole, 67 AD3d 1108 [3rdDept., 20091).
In addition, the Parole Board’sdecision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (seeMatter of Tatta
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98
NY2d 604).
With respect to petitioner’s objection to conducting the parole interview by video
confLarc.nce,it is well settled that “the use of teleconferencing technology in conducting a
parole interview ‘is consistent with the statutory requirement that petitioner be “personally
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interview[ed]’”” (Mack v Travis, 283 AD2d 700, 701 [3d Dept., 20011, app dismissed 96
NY2d 896 [200 11, quoting Matter of Vanier v Travis, 274 AD2d 797,798, quoting Executive
Law 9 2594 [2] [a]; see also Matter of Webb v Travis, 26 AD3d 614 [3d Dept. 20061).
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER
Dated:

a

December
,2010
Troy, New York

Supreme Court Justice
George €3. Ceresia, Jr.
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Papers Considered:
1.
2.

3.

Order To Show Cause dated June 28,2010, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated September 22,20 10, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Petitioner’s Reply Letter dated September 29, 20 10
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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of RONDELL JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
-againstANDREA D. EVANS, CHAIRMAN/CEO
BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Puixuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-10-ST1691 Index No. 3823-10

SEALING ORDER
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in

camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent’s Exhibit B,
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent’s Exhibit D, Confidential Portion of Inmate
Status Report, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court.

ENTER
Dated:

December
, 2 0 10
Troy, New York

upreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

